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Integrating human
mobility through a rural
livelihood lens into
national adaptation and
mitigation planning

Guiding framework



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Abbreviations

COP	Conference of the Parties
CSO	civil society organizations
DRR	disaster risk reduction
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GCM	Global Compact on Migration
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	internally displaced persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
INDCs	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ICCCC	Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee on Climate Change
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LAPA	Local Adaptation Plan of Action
LDC	least developed country
LEG	Least Developed Countries Expert Group
MEL	monitoring, evaluation and learning
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NAP-GSP	National Adaptation Plan Global Support Programme

NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NGO	non-governmental organization
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SFDRR	Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
SOGIESC	sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics
ToC	Theory of Change
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNU-EHS	United Nations University: Institute for Environment and Human Security
WFP	World Food Programme

Note on terminology

Below are the definitions of key terms relating to human mobility and rural livelihoods used throughout this guiding framework. Please also see the Glossary for the full list of terms and their definitions.

Human mobility

In this guiding framework, human mobility is used as an umbrella term and refers to the movement of people, households and communities away from their usual place of residence. This mobility occurs on a forced-voluntary continuum and includes migration, displacement and planned relocation. The guiding framework also considers *immobility* in the context of climate and environmental change. Immobility refers to the phenomenon of staying in place because people either do not want to or do not have the ability to move. Hence, immobility can also be seen on a forced-voluntary spectrum. We use the following definitions for different types of human mobility:

- **Migration:** The movement of people or groups of people, either across an international border or within a state. Migration encompasses any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes,¹ and includes migration for work, education or to join family members.
- **Displacement:** The movement of people who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, particularly due to the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, and climate-related or human-made disasters.¹
- **Planned relocation:** A planned process in which people or groups of people move or are assisted to move away from their homes or temporary residences to a new location.¹ Planned relocation can occur in response to observed or anticipated risks and hazards associated with climate change, such as sea-level rise.

Rural livelihoods

By *rural livelihoods*, we refer to all activities linked to food production and income generation in agrifood systems. We recognize that *agriculture*, which includes crops, livestock, fishing, aquaculture, and forestry, is a major part of rural livelihoods, especially in low- and middle-income countries. We also acknowledge that rural households' livelihood portfolios tend to involve multiple activities, including in different sub-sectors within agriculture (e.g. growing crops as well as raising livestock), in different components of the agricultural value chain (e.g. fishing and post-harvest processing and sales of fish and fish products), as well as some non-farm activities (e.g. hawking or trading, driving rickshaws).

Purpose

Climate change, including sudden onset events and slow onset climatic processes that are increasing in frequency, intensity and magnitude, is already having adverse impacts on the lives and livelihoods of rural populations. Rural populations depend on climate-sensitive natural resources for food and income, making them highly exposed to the effects of changing climatic and environmental conditions. At the same time, their ability to adapt to these changes is often limited by a variety of structural factors, such as poverty and inequality.

Climatic and environmental change interact with social, economic, political and demographic factors and contribute to the need and decision to move among rural populations. This mobility can take the form of labour migration as a rural livelihood diversification strategy, displacement in the aftermath of extreme events such as storms and flooding, or planned relocation when it is no longer possible to adapt to changing conditions. For example, the Groundswell II Report³⁸ predicts that globally, between 75 million and 216 million people could be compelled to migrate internally by 2050 due to slow onset climate change impacts on livelihoods. Climate change can also lead to people becoming “trapped” in high-risk areas when it depletes or destroys the assets and resources needed for moving.

Although climate-related mobility and, to a lesser extent, immobility have gained attention, including in policy debates, the focus often remains on migration destinations, especially cities and industrialized countries. Less attention is given to places of rural origin despite a large share of migrants coming from rural areas. Rural areas also receive migrants and provide refuge to internally displaced persons (IDPs).² According to recent estimates, around 30 percent of refugees globally are found in rural areas, with rural parts of sub-Saharan Africa hosting up to 80 percent of the region’s refugees.³ When rural settings are considered, the focus tends to be (i) on the socio-economic impacts of rural out-migration vis-à-vis a so-called “brain or labour drain”, (ii) on the role of financial, social, and to a lesser extent, in-kind remittances in supporting the development and resilience of rural households and communities, and (iii) on the environmental impacts of rural out-migration due to changing demand for and dependence on natural resources.⁴⁻⁶

This guiding framework, along with its complementary **toolkit**, facilitates the integration of human mobility, specifically through a rural livelihood lens, into national adaptation and mitigation planning and into the policies, processes and programmes related to implementing these plans. First, the publication presents evidence from research demonstrating the intricate links between climate change, rural livelihoods and mobility and highlights the importance of considering these in adaptation and mitigation planning. Second, it introduces a guiding framework, which offers an overarching approach, complete with a set of core principles and key actions. The guiding framework supports policy and decision-makers, practitioners and development actors working at the intersection of climate change, rural livelihoods, and human mobility and assists those involved in or supporting countries with preparing their National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).



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**The nexus between
climate change,
rural livelihoods and
human mobility**

Climate change – often combined with other systemic challenges, such as conflict and economic crises – adversely affects global agrifood systems, with implications for food security.^{7,8} These implications are significant because the world's agrifood systems employ an estimated 1.23 billion people, and more than three times that number live in households dependent on agrifood systems.⁹ In fact, in 2021, extreme weather events were among the main drivers of acute food insecurity, affecting 193 million people globally.¹⁰

In years to come, the negative impacts of climate change on agrifood systems are expected to intensify, leading to extensive loss and damage across all agricultural sectors: crops, livestock, forestry, fishing and aquaculture.¹¹ Small-scale farmers in developing countries who depend on agriculture for food and income will be particularly hard hit. Globally, there are some 475 million smallholder farm families.¹² They are highly exposed to climate change impacts *vis-à-vis* their resource-based livelihoods and have limited capacity to adapt to changing conditions due to high levels of poverty, coupled with other structural and institutional constraints, such as inequality, limited access to information, basic services and decent employment, education, healthcare, extension advice and social protection.¹³

When climate change intersects with political, economic, social and demographic conditions¹⁴ and undermines rural livelihoods and food security, rural households may be compelled to move. Mobility in the context of climate change usually occurs on a forced-voluntary continuum and can vary in length and destination (**Figure 1**). Following sudden-onset events, people may be displaced, they may also employ migration as an adaptation strategy in response to climate change impacts on rural livelihoods, or be relocated in anticipation that places may become unsafe or uninhabitable.

Displacement following extreme events generally involves shorter distances, and, for most people, it is a short-term or temporary movement from their places of origin. When migration is employed as a livelihood diversification strategy by climate-affected rural households, it can be short-term and temporary, as in circular or seasonal migration. However, it can also be long-term and may eventually become permanent. Whereas, planned relocation tends to be permanent.

Migration is increasingly recognized as an effective adaptation strategy that can help climate-affected households diversify their income sources and build resilience.^{14, 15} Given the right policy and legal support, migration can improve the socio-economic conditions of migrants and their families, for example, through greater access to employment, services and other life opportunities.¹⁶ Through the transfer of social and financial remittances and diaspora investment, migration can potentially strengthen the future resilience of rural livelihoods.^{17, 18} Although migration is often viewed negatively in migration destinations, it can also benefit receiving communities by filling labour shortages and increasing social and cultural diversity. Migrants can also help solve sustainability challenges at their destination thanks to their knowledge, skills and networks.^{16, 19} However, in the absence of supportive policies, migration in the context of climate change can also lead to loss and damage for migrants and their families or households, which can undermine its success as an adaptation strategy.²⁰


Although policy debates tend to emphasize climate mobility, people do not always have the capabilities or may not aspire to move, even when they are aware of the climate risks. As well as driving mobility, climate change can also constrain migration by eroding necessary resources.²¹ Due to reduced assets and finances,²² poor

and vulnerable households are often less likely to migrate following repeated exposure to climate extremes, such as droughts. People may also choose to stay or resist planned relocation due to a strong emotional bond with their ancestral lands, cultural heritage, and traditional livelihoods^{23, 24} (see **Figure 1**). For example, research across seven African countries found that despite reporting worsening climatic and environmental conditions, most people did not have plans to move due to a strong sense of belonging, attachment to the land, risk aversion and the hope that conditions will improve in rural places of origin. In some cases, the lack of desire was compounded by a lack of capacity to move – also referred to as acquiescent immobility – indicating high levels of vulnerability in rural Africa.²⁵ Thus, migration as adaptation may not be an equal possibility for or desired by all climate-affected populations.

Climate change and human mobility: past, present and future trends

While migration is an age-old response to seasonality in the context of rural livelihoods and an inherent part of nomadic pastoralism, migration from regions in which households and communities have high levels of exposure to climate-related hazards and low levels of adaptive capacity is increasing as climate change intensifies.²⁶ Evidence presented in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 6th Assessment Report²⁷ demonstrates that climatic disruptions to rural livelihoods can influence the need or decision to migrate. For example, droughts have been associated with periods of higher rural-to-urban migration in Mexico²⁸⁻³⁰ and Senegal.³¹ Extreme temperatures have been linked to higher rates of temporary

FIGURE 1. Elaboration of human mobility and immobility outcomes on a forced-voluntary continuum in the context of climate change



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

rural out-migration in South Africa and Bangladesh.^{32, 33} Weather-related shocks to crop production have been observed to increase the likelihood of migration in the United Republic of Tanzania,³⁴ and weather-related losses in rice production have been associated with a small increase in internal migration in India³⁵ and the Philippines.³⁶

Weather-related shocks such as storms, floods, droughts, wildfires and extreme heat – though not all are directly linked to climate change – account for a large share of new internal displacements each year. In 2022, weather-related disasters displaced 31.9 million people worldwide, with floods, storms and droughts being the leading cause of displacement.³⁷ Displacement, including climate-induced displacement, negatively impacts food and nutrition security due to the disruption of livelihoods, difficulties in accessing food, and food-based coping strategies employed by IDPs (such as skipping meals or lowering nutritional intake).³⁷ In 2022, 75 percent of countries facing crisis levels of food insecurity (as per the Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC scale) had IDPs.³⁷

These trends are likely to persist without concerted and inclusive climate and development action. In many regions, the frequency and severity of floods, extreme storms and droughts are projected to increase in coming decades, elevating the likelihood of future mobility in the most exposed areas.²⁷ It is foreseen that rising sea levels and flooding in Bangladesh and Viet Nam, for example, will jeopardize fishing and crop cultivation, thus prompting outmigration from these rural areas.²⁷ Most people who move in the context of climate change tend to move within the same country or world region. The Groundswell II Report³⁸ predicts that globally, between 75 million and 216 million people could be compelled to migrate internally by 2050 due to slow onset climate change impacts on livelihoods. Additionally, modelling by the Africa Climate Mobility Initiative (ACMI)

suggests that up to 5 percent of Africa's population, or 213 million people, could move by 2050 due to climate impacts. Rural and coastal areas are anticipated to become areas of out-migration due to changes in rainfall patterns, flooding, sea-level rise and other climate stressors.³⁹ These estimates are based on available climate and population data and present possible future climate mobility scenarios. However, it is important to note that these projections are highly uncertain, and future climate mobility trajectories will depend on multiple factors, including social, political and economic conditions in climate-affected geographies and future climate and development action.

Climate mobility and loss and damage in the context of rural livelihoods

Human mobility is considered both a source and a symptom of climate-related loss and damage.⁴⁰ It can also constitute loss and damage itself.⁴¹ In general, loss and damage from climate change usually refers to those negative impacts that occur despite adaptation and mitigation. Loss represents harm beyond repair (such as loss of life, crops or habitable land), while damage refers to things that can be fixed (such as damage to property, assets or infrastructure).^{42, 43}

Human mobility is a symptom of loss and damage in that loss and damage can prompt migration, displacement or planned relocation, and also render people immobile due to the loss of means to migrate. Human mobility is also a source of loss and damage because when people move, they often lose their traditional livelihoods, traditional or Indigenous knowledge, social networks or connection to their ancestral lands, among other things.^{44, 45} Additionally, migrants, refugees and IDPs often experience multiple intersecting challenges in transit and at their destinations, while family members who remain in rural places of origin also suffer through, for example, increased workloads,

stress and anxiety.^{20, 46, 47} Similarly, if planned relocation is not undertaken with the meaningful participation of affected communities, it can result in the loss of traditional ways of life, livelihoods and economic security and have implications for the mental health of relocated populations.⁴⁸

In the context of forced displacement, such as in the aftermath of extreme weather events, those affected lose the ability to exercise one of the most fundamental human rights, the right to self-determination. When people become displaced, they lose the agency to choose where and how they live.⁴⁹ Thus, forced displacement can also be considered a form of loss and damage in its own right. Marginalized populations are particularly vulnerable to mobility-related loss and damage. For example, in 2021, Brazil recorded 411 000 flood displacements affecting many Black and Indigenous communities. Once displaced, these communities struggled to meet their basic needs.⁵⁰

This underscores the need to acknowledge and identify both economic and non-economic forms of loss and damage that occur before, during, and after different types of movement or due to immobility. Explicitly considering and addressing such loss and damage in policy and planning is also key to facilitating migration and planned relocation as successful adaptation.²⁰

Examples of guidelines, policies, programmes and legal frameworks that aim to avert or minimize loss and damage in the context of climate-related mobility already exist at different scales: global, regional and national (Table 1). Most of these relate to situations of forced displacement, however, some also cover migration and planned relocation in anticipation of climate change impacts. They highlight possible ways in which considerations of loss and damage at the intersection of climate change, mobility and rural livelihoods can be integrated into the design and implementation of mitigation and adaptation plans, programmes, and interventions.

TABLE 1. Examples of efforts to avert and minimize loss and damage due to climate-related mobility

Examples	Scale	Type of mobility
Displacement Guidelines in the Context of Climate Change and Disastersⁱ – It recognizes displacement as the outcome of climate-related loss and damage, such as the loss of traditional livelihoods and food security. It employs a livelihood-based approach and highlights the need to ensure that displaced populations have access to livelihoods in their new location, as well as opportunities for livelihood diversification and capacity expansion, where appropriate. The country's Planned Relocation Guidelines ⁱⁱ are also informed by these principles and recommendations for the livelihoods of relocated persons.	National: Fiji	Displacement
Vanuatu National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacementⁱⁱⁱ – The policy aims to integrate human mobility into key sectoral policy areas dealing with climate, disasters, environment, health, education, land, housing, infrastructure planning, food security and livelihoods. It also includes facilitating managed international labour migration as a livelihood adaptation strategy.	National: Vanuatu	Displacement

(cont.)

Examples	Scale	Type of mobility
Argentina's Visa for Persons Displaced by Socio-Natural Disasters ^{iv} – created in 2022, the visa aims to facilitate regular pathways for those affected by sudden-onset disasters, including climate-related events. It targets both internal and cross-border displacements. The visa allows an initial three-year residence and provides a pathway to permanent residence in Argentina following that period.	Regional: Latin America and the Caribbean	Displacement
Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security Programme ^v – Currently in its second phase (2023–2025), the programme aims to: (i) facilitate collaboration between governments in the Pacific region on climate-related mobility, (ii) support governments with developing national policies on climate-related mobility, and (iii) to promote engagement between government, civil society actors and communities on issues relating to the management of climate-related mobility.	Regional: Pacific	Migration
Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union ^{vi} – it comprises a bilateral agreement between the governments of Australia and Tuvalu to navigate the shared challenges of climate change and security. It establishes a visa arrangement for Tuvaluans to live, work and study in Australia. As such, it aims to facilitate human mobility with dignity while also supporting Tuvalu's climate adaptation and development needs.	Regional: Pacific	Migration
Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation ^{vii} – acknowledges that while planned relocation may be a means to protect people, it also carries the risk of disrupting livelihoods and loss of cultural practices. It includes provisions for providing the conditions for livelihood restoration: maintaining traditional livelihoods where possible and facilitating the acquisition of new skills and livelihoods where that is not possible.	Global	Planned relocation

Sources:

- i. **Government of the Republic of Fiji.** 2019. *Displacement Guidelines in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters*. Suva, Fiji.
- ii. **Government of the Republic of Fiji.** 2018. *Planned Relocation Guidelines: A framework to undertake climate change related relocation*. Suva, Fiji.
- iii. **Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office.** 2018. *Vanuatu National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement*.
- iv. **Platform on Disaster Displacement.** 2023. *Argentina: Leading initiatives to address displacement in the context of disasters and climate change*, Policy Brief. https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Policy_Brief_Argentina_compressed.pdf
- v. **International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Fiji.** n.d. *Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security (PCCMHS) Programme Phase II*. IOM, Fiji.
- vi. **Government of Australia.** 2024. *Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union*. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-placemat.pdf>
- vii. **Brookings Institution & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).** 2015. *Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation*. The Brookings Institution, Georgetown University and UNHCR. <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1411/files/Guidance%20on%20Planned%20Relocations%20-%20Split%20PDF.pdf>

Human mobility and rural livelihoods in National Adaptation Plans and Nationally Determined Contributions

Countries develop National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), both of which are instruments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (see **Box 1** and **Box 2**), as part of their efforts on climate action, sustainable development and disaster risk reduction (DRR). These instruments help countries achieve the goals of the Cancun Adaptation

Framework and the Paris Agreement and align with the Sustainable Development Goals⁵¹ (SDGs) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction⁵² (SFDRR).

Recent analysis reveals that NAPs and NDCs increasingly consider different forms of mobility. Of the 53 NAPs submitted to the UNFCCC as of February 2024, 85 percent refer to some form of mobility, although only 66 percent include provisions for addressing climate-related mobility. Displacement is mentioned most frequently (74 percent), followed by migration (68 percent) and relocation (55 percent) (**Figure 2**). Immobility is considered in NAPs to a lesser degree.⁵⁴ Mirwald and Oakes⁵⁵ analysed 30 NAPs and

Box 1. What are National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)?

The NAP process was established at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 16 in 2010 under the Cancun Adaptation Framework to identify medium and long-term adaptation needs and to develop and implement strategies, programmes and plans to address those needs.ⁱ All developing countries have been invited to develop NAPs and many developed countries have also chosen to do so. Later, the COP28 decision (CMA.5) called on all Parties to develop their NAPs by 2025 and to have made progress on their implementation by 2030.ⁱⁱ The NAPs build on the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA), which were established in 2001 to help least developed countries (LDCs) respond to their urgent and immediate adaptation needs.ⁱⁱⁱ NAPs have two objectives: (1) to reduce vulnerability to climate change impacts by increasing adaptive capacity and building resilience; and (2) to facilitate the integration of climate change adaptation into relevant policies, plans and processes, particularly development planning.^{iv} As of February 2024, 53 countries have submitted their NAPs to the UNFCCC secretariat.

Sources:

- i. **United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)**. 2011. Decision 5/CP.17, National Adaptation Plans. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1.
- ii. **UNFCCC**. 2023. First Global Stocktake, Proposal by the President. Draft decision -/CMA.5. FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/L.17.
- iii. **UNFCCC**. 2002. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventh Session, held at Marrakech from 29 October to 10 November 2001.
- iv. **Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG)**. 2012. National Adaptation Plans. Technical Guidelines for the National Adaptation Plan Process. Bonn, Germany, UNFCCC Secretariat.


Box 2. What are Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)?

As part of their commitment to achieving the global goals of the Paris Agreement, the Parties committed to preparing and submitting NDCs every five years, starting in 2015. The NDCs are essentially an overview of how each country intends to fulfil their mitigation commitments. Many countries have also chosen to include information on adaptation and loss and damage in their NDCs. Many see the adaptation components of NDCs as important references for evaluating countries' progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation and the Global Stocktake, where the latter informs future NDCs due in 2025.

50 related policies and found that only 10 percent refer to immobility. When it comes to NDCs, human mobility is generally discussed within the adaptation component, which not all NDCs have, as it is included on a voluntary basis.⁵⁶ Overall, 70 percent of the 134 NDCs submitted by October 2021 included an adaptation component,


and 39 percent of the 156 new or updated NDCs submitted by March 2022 mentioned human mobility in some form.⁵⁷ In NDCs, migration was the most referenced form of human mobility (18 percent), followed by displacement (15 percent) and relocation (6 percent)⁵⁷ (Figure 3).

FIGURE 2. Mobility in 53 National Adaptation Plans as of February 2024



Source: SLYCAN Trust. 2024. *Briefing Note: Human Mobility in National Adaptation Plans* (updated version).

FIGURE 3. Mobility in 156 Nationally Determined Contributions as of March 2022



Source: SLYCAN Trust. 2022. *Integrating Climate-Related Human Mobility into Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans*.

Despite growing recognition of human mobility in NAPs and NDCs, a gap remains in identifying concrete actions to address climate-related mobility and immobility. More broadly, this calls for improved coherence between NAPs, NDCs, and national development planning, policies and processes.⁵⁷ However, limited guidance is available on achieving such coherence,⁵⁶ and even less guidance exists on how to identify and implement specific actions to address human mobility and immobility in the context of rural livelihoods affected by the adverse impacts of climate change.

Many NAPs and NDCs identify agriculture as one of the sectors most impacted by climate change. For example, NDCs have demonstrated a growing recognition of the urgency of climate action within agriculture: as of July 2021, 95 percent of NDCs included adaptation and mitigation in agriculture.⁵⁸ However, the majority of NAPs and NDCs do not consider mobility and rural livelihoods together. This underscores the need for urgent action because rural populations are disproportionately affected by climate change, and much of climate-related mobility occurs in the context of rural settings.^{38, 39} Since NAPs and NDCs are where countries identify their adaptation and mitigation needs and elaborate a plan

for addressing them, integrating mobility through a rural livelihood lens can help countries **(i) address the adverse drivers of both mobility and immobility in rural areas, and (ii) leverage the benefits of mobility for climate change adaptation and mitigation.**

The NAPs and NDCs that consider mobility and immobility in the context of rural livelihoods may include actions that promote the adoption of climate-smart agricultural practices while also ensuring access to social protection, agricultural extension services and skills training, taking into account the needs and vulnerabilities of different groups (such as children, youth, women, persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, etc.). They may also consider migration as one potential adaptation strategy in the context of rural livelihoods and incorporate provisions for enabling safe, orderly and regular migration while also facilitating the transfer of social, financial and in-kind remittances and their utilization towards building climate-resilient rural livelihoods.

The following guiding framework can help support the integration of human mobility from a rural livelihoods perspective into the development of NAPs and NDCs.



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Guiding framework


A key tenet of integrating human mobility from a rural livelihood perspective into NAPs and NDCs is improved coordination, cooperation and coherence among relevant stakeholders, institutions and processes involved in adaptation and mitigation planning. Given the complexity of climate change and its impact on both society and the natural environment, it is important that adaptation and mitigation plans adopt a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to implementing climate action. It is also important that adaptation and mitigation planning recognizes that climate change impacts are not confined within country borders. They impact shared natural resources and affect rural livelihoods that stretch across borders. These cross-border considerations become particularly relevant when climate change alters the conditions on which rural livelihoods depend, disrupts established mobility patterns or drives new mobility in affected geographic areas.

To successfully integrate human mobility through a rural livelihood lens into NAPs and NDCs, the following key actions are recommended:

- a theory of change that explicitly recognizes the links between climate change, rural livelihoods and mobility;
- coherence and coordination between stakeholders, institutions and organizations at vertical and horizontal scales;
- the creation of networks that drive communication and collaboration on issues relating to the climate change, rural livelihoods and human mobility nexus; and
- opportunities and dedicated spaces for communication and collaboration between relevant stakeholders.

Implementing the overall approach and key actions through NAP and NDC processes should be grounded in the core principles of inclusion, diversity and gender responsiveness (see [Figure 4](#)).

FIGURE 4. Guiding framework to support the integration of human mobility from a rural livelihood perspective into National Adaptation Plans and Nationally Determined Contributions



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

The development of the guiding framework, including the overall approach, key actions and core principles, was informed by desk-based research, as well as key informant interviews and focus groups with representatives of government, civil society organizations (CSOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies from seven selected case study countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guatemala, Nepal and Zimbabwe), along with global experts on climate policy and human mobility. The case study countries were chosen based on their geographical diversity, the range of climate change impacts experienced or projected to occur, the importance of rural livelihoods to the economy and the different types of climate-related human mobility occurring.

Overall approach

Whole-of-government

A whole-of-government approach involves government departments working together to solve complex issues like climate change that reach beyond departmental boundaries.⁵⁹ The approach requires effective communication among government actors during the development of NAPs and NDCs. This can be achieved through vertical and horizontal integration between local and national actors who are involved in different domains of the climate change, human mobility and rural livelihoods nexus.

Horizontal integration entails coordination and communication between different

Good practice examples

Whole-of-government

Fiji: Fiji's development of the NDC Implementation Roadmap⁶² (2017–2030) was led by the Climate Change Unit and Strategic Planning Office of the Ministry of Economy. The process was collaborative with contributions from and participation of relevant ministries (revenue, statistics, central and development banks) and the Office of the Prime Minister. The process involved: 1) establishing a steering committee mainly composed of government institutions; 2) holding one-on-one meetings with ministries, departments and agencies, private sector companies, national universities, development partners and trade associations; and 3) organizing workshops to present the findings of the fundamental assessment to all stakeholders.

Nepal: Nepal's NAP⁶³ has benefitted from advanced work on vertical integration through Local Adaptation Plans for Action (LAPAs). LAPAs can bridge national and local priorities and enable the mobilization of resources for local-level needs and priorities.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the LAPAs recognize the importance of locally-led adaptation plans and take a bottom-up approach. The Ministry of Forests and Environment is the focal ministry for the NAP and also coordinates the Interministerial Coordination Committee on Climate Change, which is composed of half governmental and half non-governmental actors. The Provincial Climate Change Coordination Committee, which comprises province-level government authorities and representatives, civil society and local governments, is one of the key bodies that coordinate the development of the NAP. It oversees the coordination of NAP activities at the provincial level.

policy sectors at the same administrative scale.⁶⁰ For example, it can involve different government ministries responsible for different sectors (e.g. migration, labour, climate and environment, rural development, agriculture) coordinating their efforts to design and implement policies, plans and programmes that integrate mobility through a rural livelihood lens into climate change adaptation or mitigation efforts. Vertical integration, which connects national, sub-national and local policies, plans and processes, is also critical because the successful integration of mobility and immobility considerations into NAPs and NDCs also requires cooperation between different levels of government. Lessons on how to achieve vertical integration are available through existing and ongoing country efforts on adaptation. The NAP Global Network also developed guidelines to support vertical integration within NAPs⁶¹ by identifying key enabling factors such as information sharing, institutional arrangements and capacity development to facilitate the dialogue between relevant actors and capacity enhancement at all levels.

Whole-of-society

A whole-of-society approach recognizes that the complex challenges presented by climate change require action that combines the efforts of all societal actors. Alongside government

actors, a whole-of-society approach involves representatives from civil society, academia, the private sector, and community members in policy development and implementation.^{65, 66} Countries that have used this approach report that it helped ensure more comprehensive and inclusive NDCs, and NAPs could benefit in the same way.

In the context of NAPs and NDCs, it means engaging all aspects of society implicated in the climate change, rural livelihoods, and mobility nexus. Private sector, migrant and diaspora organizations can play a key role in leveraging the benefits of mobility for climate change adaptation and mitigation, for instance, by investing in green agribusiness and creating green jobs. A whole-of-society approach can also facilitate the meaningful participation of migrants, refugees, and host communities in shaping climate action.⁶⁷

Transboundary

The impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods can have implications that extend beyond country borders. Resources on which livelihoods depend, such as water resources, are often shared and managed by several nation-states. Climate change can intensify competition over these shared resources and lead to political tensions.⁷⁰ For example, climate change has disrupted the mobility patterns of transhumant and pastoralist groups who often cross national borders

Good practice examples

Whole-of-society

Grenada and Uganda: Grenada's NDC⁶⁸ followed a multi-sectoral and whole-of-society approach that included the engagement of key ministries, public and private stakeholders, academic and technical experts, civil society organizations and vulnerable and marginalized populations. While Uganda's NDC⁶⁹ applied both a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, using a hybrid format of both in-person and virtual meetings to update its NDC during the COVID-19 pandemic. The hybrid mode of participation was based on regional workshops and youth and civil society consultations that enabled the identification of diverse climate actions. Policymakers then discussed and prioritized these actions during the sectoral consultations, which aimed to ensure alignment with overarching national planning and budgeting frameworks.

to gain access to grazing land. The impacts of climate change events and processes on rural farmers can also prompt labour migration or lead to displacement across country borders, increasing competition over resources. Even attempts to preserve shared resources through transboundary conservation initiatives or transboundary protected areas can negatively impact rural livelihoods. For example, they may restrict access to land and resources or even displace rural households from their land, hindering traditional practices that are key to maintaining rural livelihoods. As such, these measures can also act as adverse drivers of mobility and undermine the well-being and security of people who cannot move.⁷¹

To avoid such negative outcomes, it is also critical to integrate transboundary considerations into the NAP and NDC process along with taking a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. Transboundary adaptation and mitigation planning requires cooperation and collaboration between sovereign states on a variety of transboundary linkages, such as connected landscapes and ecosystems (often with upstream and downstream implications), the movement of economic goods and services, as well as the movement of people.^{72, 73} While NAPs and NDCs are developed in the context of national

adaptation and mitigation planning, they should also consider and identify areas where climate action may require cooperation with neighbouring states that share resources or at the regional level where legal and policy frameworks may already be in place (e.g. on the governance of human mobility) and are relevant for responding to climate change impacts at the national level. As such, NAPs and NDCs can serve as an important vehicle for advancing regional coordination on the nexus of climate change, rural livelihoods (e.g. vis-à-vis shared natural resources) and human mobility by integrating transboundary considerations in national climate adaptation and mitigation planning and policy.

Transboundary considerations in NAPs and NDCs should involve:

- i. understanding the extent to which people move across borders as well as the main drivers of cross-border movement;
- ii. considering ecosystems (such as river basins, lakes, mountains or deserts) as one unit of analysis, planning and action;
- iii. identifying gaps in national planning that could be addressed through transnational planning; and
- iv. recognizing the benefits of and actively pursuing transnational collaboration.

Good practice example

Transboundary

Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe's revised NDC⁷⁶ recognizes the importance of transboundary considerations due to the spill-over effects of climate change. The NDC identifies the most relevant transboundary considerations for the country as: cross-border trade of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, infrastructure and transport, the migration and displacement of people, and the spread of diseases and invasive species. Additionally, the country has a high level of transboundary water dependency, with all of Zimbabwe's water basins shared with other countries. Given the pressures of climate change, transboundary cooperation on climate change adaptation and mitigation is required to sustain water availability and supply, which is crucial for rural livelihoods and other sectors.

Examples of collaboration on mobility and resource conservation between states can offer lessons for integrating transboundary considerations into NAPs and NDCs. For example, members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) established Trans-Frontier Conservation Areas and demonstrated the benefits of cooperation over resource use for peace, security and environmental sustainability.⁷⁴ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) developed a regional mechanism that facilitates movement across borders, including the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998), which recognizes and supports cross-border transhumance as a key livelihood in the region.⁷⁵

Core principles

Inclusion and diversity

Ensuring a diversity of engagement and facilitating the participation of all relevant stakeholders, especially underrepresented and marginalized groups such as youth, women, ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees, is an important precursor to a comprehensive NAP or NDC. The importance of participation in policy decisions regarding climate action is widely recognized.^{77, 78} The involvement of diverse actors affected by climate change impacts can bring about more just and equitable outcomes vis-à-vis adaptation and mitigation. It can also enhance the legitimacy and public acceptance of policies and interventions, thus supporting their successful implementation.^{79, 80} Additionally, including diverse forms of knowledge and lived experiences of climate change in adaptation and mitigation planning can also contribute to more effective, equitable and sustainable outcomes. It is important to acknowledge and understand that everyone does not experience climate change impacts in the same way. Climate change impacts are distributed unevenly across society, with some groups bearing a heavier burden. People's capacity to

adapt to climate change is also different. While some might be able to respond effectively to minimize loss and damage, others may struggle to do so. Integrating this knowledge into NAPs and NDCs can help address the root causes of vulnerability and support the capacity of all stakeholders to respond to climate change.^{81, 82} Likewise, integrating diverse forms of knowledge, practices and technologies – for instance, by combining new technologies and traditional or Indigenous knowledge – within the design and implementation of adaptation and mitigation planning can lead to interventions that are inclusive and more sustainable in the long run.^{83, 84}

To address inclusion and diversity in NAP and NDC processes, it is first necessary to understand who is currently included and excluded and how and why.⁸⁵ The National Adaptation Plan Global Support Programme (NAP-GSP)^a proposed that decision and policymakers ask three overarching questions which have implications for equity and justice – recognition, procedural and distributive justices:

- 1. Whose needs are considered?** – Encourages reflection on whose needs and interests are considered in NAP and NDC processes and whose needs are missing. For example, marginalized groups such as Indigenous Peoples, migrants, refugees, and in some contexts women, who lack representation in NAP and NDC processes and consultations and are often overlooked, with their unique vulnerabilities not catered for in mitigation and adaptation planning.
- 2. Who makes decisions?** – Prompts a reflection on whether or not all groups can participate in decision-

^a The NAP-GSP was a joint UNDP-UNEP programme which supported developing country governments in identifying technical, institutional and financial needs to integrate climate change adaptation into medium and long-term national planning and financing. The programme operationally closed in December 2021.

making processes. It helps identify those excluded from decision-making spaces and the barriers preventing their participation. For example, low-income migrants in urban informal settlements or refugees and IDPs in camps may not be aware of opportunities to engage in NAP and NDC processes and may also lack representation in these.

- 3. Who benefits and who loses?** – Brings attention to the impacts decisions about mitigation and adaptation may have on different groups of people. It highlights that not everyone stands to benefit, as there may be unintended negative consequences, which can reinforce vulnerability. For example, in the past, climate change adaptation projects, such as infrastructure development, have caused the displacement of Indigenous Peoples from their ancestral lands and traditional rural livelihoods.

Participatory approaches have a long history in the field of development,⁸⁶ and several frameworks and best practices have emerged that can guide the design of inclusive NAP and NDC processes that enable the participation of all relevant stakeholders.

Gender responsiveness

Gender responsiveness is a cross-cutting issue that also applies to the nexus of climate change, human mobility and rural livelihoods. Therefore, it needs to be

integrated into every step and dimension of climate policy plans, processes and strategies. There is a critical difference between gender sensitivity, which acknowledges but does not address gender inequality, and gender responsiveness, which aims to address the reasons why men and women are differentially vulnerable.

It is critical to both acknowledge and address intersectionality, or how different dimensions of vulnerability interact with one another. For example, in many social contexts, women are still more vulnerable to climate change than men due to factors such as the gendered distributions of rights, resources and property, access to education, employment, extension advice and early warning systems.⁸⁸ This is especially true for rural women as more rural women than rural men are engaged in agriculture worldwide and spend more time on care work.⁸⁹ When men migrate, rural women tend to take on even more additional work in agriculture, either on their own farms or as waged labourers. Yet, they face additional constraints in accessing productive resources and services (e.g. extension advice, training, information). The NAPs Global Support Programme (NAP-GSP) developed a five-step approach to ensuring gender responsiveness in adaptation planning, which can also be applied to mitigation planning⁸⁵ (**Box 3**). It can help ensure that rural and mobile women are explicitly considered and that their needs and vulnerabilities are addressed throughout all stages of NAP and NDC processes.

Good practice example

Inclusion and diversity

Argentina: Argentina's NDC⁸⁷ utilizes the inclusive concept of community-based adaptation and stresses that communities, including vulnerable populations, are leaders in processes aimed at reducing their vulnerabilities, reducing emissions and increasing their adaptation capacities to climate change. It maintains, therefore, that communities must be included in leading climate policy processes to capture their priorities, needs and knowledge.

Various resources are available to help with understanding the role of gender and intersectionality in shaping people's vulnerability to climate change impacts, including in rural settings. The European Capacity Building Initiative produced a pocket guide to gender equality under the UNFCCC,⁹⁰ which includes information on programmes and initiatives supporting gender responsiveness. The NAP Global

Network and UNFCCC published a toolkit for a gender-responsive process to formulate and implement NAPs as a supplement to the UNFCCC technical guidelines for NAPs.⁹¹ The Global Environment Facility has partnered with several others to offer an online course on gender and the environment,⁹² while FAO developed an online course on addressing gender equality in climate change adaptation and mitigation in agriculture.⁹³

Box 3: The NAPs Global Support Programme's five steps towards gender responsiveness:

1. Commit to finding **entry points** for integrating gender considerations at each stage of the process.
2. Get **informed** to better understand who is vulnerable and why by applying gender analysis tools.
3. **Connect relevant actors** working on climate change and gender to convene regular dialogues about integrating gender into climate policies and plans.
4. Assess **who benefits, how and why (or why not)** from actions to address climate change through the collection of gender-disaggregated data to develop an understanding of how adaptation planning affects marginalized populations.
5. **Reflect** on progress toward gender equality and empowerment of women and girls.

Source: **National Adaptation Plan Global Support Programme (NAP-GSP)**. 2019. *Online Compendium: Formulating, Implementing and Financing a Successful NAP process*. NAP-GSP.

Good practice examples

Gender responsiveness

Ethiopia: Ethiopia's NAP⁹⁴ includes explicit gender-responsive strategies to ensure gender inclusion within the national policymaking processes. In addition, one of the five strategic priorities for implementing the NAP is improving the knowledge management system for the NAP, for which the program will collect gender-disaggregated data at all levels and continue to improve the depth, range and quality of the data.

Kiribati: Kiribati's NDC⁹⁵ integrates gender responsiveness building on the Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management,⁹⁶ which defines priority adaptation measures to address current and ongoing risks from climate change. Under this Plan, i) everything conceived and developed shall consider the differences between and among women and men regarding needs and capacities, ii) the differentiated impacts of climate adaptation shall be monitored, and iii) gender balance in participation and influence in decision-making shall be achieved.

Key actions

Co-developing a Theory of Change

Building a theory of change can provide the foundation for NAPs and NDCs. The Theory of Change (ToC) process helps define the long-term vision or goal, identifies building blocks and the relationship between them, maps out a path for achieving the vision and anticipates any challenges that might be faced along the way.^{97, 98} Developing a ToC has been recognized as a robust and appropriate approach to designing and evaluating climate change adaptation, which is inherently complex, multifaceted, and long-term in scope. It is also an opportunity to articulate the role of human mobility in climate adaptation and mitigation, including any necessary steps and provisions to help maximize this role.

Co-developing a ToC helps bring stakeholders together, creates the conditions for better policy integration and linkages – both

vertically and horizontally – enhances the legitimacy of plans and improves willingness and capacity for implementation. At the same time, a ToC can also be used during the monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) stage to evaluate outcomes and identify areas of success and areas for future actions. Researchers at Climate Analytics have developed a ToC framework for adaptation planning for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (**Box 4**), which could also be applied to mitigation planning and used by other countries.⁹⁸ An adapted version could also consider human mobility and its potential role in climate adaptation and mitigation.

Creating networks

Establishing and strengthening centralized bodies on climate change

Several developing countries have climate change committees or other relevant bodies serving as advisory bodies and providing guidance on climate policy. Examples include Senegal's National Committee on Climate

Box 4: Theory of Change framework by Climate Analytics

- **Leadership and participation:** the leaders who will drive the process are selected. The most effective ToC is developed by diverse stakeholders who help incorporate different needs, perspectives and ideas.
- **Describing the problem/situation analysis:** the group studies the problem or situation that the ToC will address. This does not have to be an in-depth analysis but should identify the most critical issues.
- **Mapping a pathway to change:** which includes the long-term goal and potential outcomes or milestones associated with achieving it.
- **Defining interventions:** to determine how to achieve the long-term goal.
- **Identifying assumptions and barriers:** that might influence the outcome and developing ways of addressing them.
- **Identifying indicators:** to identify thresholds to assess progress and help determine when a desirable outcome has been achieved.
- **Developing a diagram:** to visually illustrate the ToC.

Source: Pringle, P. & Thomas, A. 2019. *Climate Adaptation and Theory of Change: Making it work for you. A practical guide for Small Island Developing States (SIDS)*.

Good practice examples

Co-developing a Theory of Change

Fiji: A ToC underpins Fiji's NAP.⁹⁹ Its vision centres on the need to update the development planning system and identify and address threats to key sectors. It recognizes that broad climate change concerns should be identified at the national level, and strategies should be developed to address these. It also recognizes that most adaptation happens at the local level and emphasizes the need to support local adaptation through existing national and sub-national development planning structures and processes.

Creating networks

Senegal: Senegal's National Committee on Climate Change includes state and local representatives who oversee the coordination, consultation, training, awareness raising, management and monitoring of the various activities identified in the implementation of the UNFCCC and its additional legal instruments.¹⁰⁰ The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development serves as the secretariat for the climate change committee and helps ensure horizontal integration across relevant sectors by working with focal points assigned by each relevant ministry/agency.

Change,¹⁰⁰ and similar initiatives in Brazil, Bangladesh, Fiji, Chile, Guatemala, Argentina and South Africa.^b With more climate change bodies emerging, there are growing opportunities to promote an exchange of good practices and lessons learned between countries using the whole-of-government approach to promote interministerial and intersectoral cooperation and coherence. Depending on the context, some of these climate change bodies have broader functions, greater autonomy and more power than others. In some cases, climate change bodies are not fully functional. This may be due to various reasons, including a lack of political will, the capacity to lead the committees, or a lack of defined roles and responsibilities.

^b Not all climate change bodies are called "committees". Brazil's is called a Forum, Guatemala's is called a Council and Argentina's a Cabinet. Despite the different terms, these bodies have similar functions and composition.

Establishing and strengthening climate change, loss and damage and migration focal points

Some countries, including Senegal, have established a network of climate change focal points across relevant ministries to strengthen coordination. Loss and damage contact points¹⁰¹ and migration focal points, such as the Council of Europe's network of focal points on migration,¹⁰² also exist. As with climate change bodies, it is critical that these focal points do not only exist in name but are also effective. Additionally, it is important that related focal points (climate change, loss and damage and human mobility) improve communication and coordination among themselves. To do this, nominated focal points must have the time and resources to strengthen coordination between relevant sectors and stakeholders.

Good practice examples

Facilitating communication and coordination

Rwanda: Rwanda's NDC¹⁰⁴ was informed by stakeholder consultations and engagement, including relevant government actors, the private sector and CSOs through a series of workshops and discussions led by the Ministry of Environment. The revision process included sectoral working groups, joint sector reviews, and private sector committees to build awareness of the NDC process and ensure their buy-in and commitment to its implementation.

Creating networks

Examples of migration and loss and damage focal points and networks: Loss and damage contact points¹⁰¹ under the UNFCCC aim to enhance the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage. Currently, 56 countries have established loss and damage focal points, one per country, which could help strengthen cooperation and coherence across government ministries and relevant sectors. In 2018, the Council of Europe launched a network of focal points on migration.¹⁰² It comprises members from relevant ministries in the member States to exchange good practices and enhance cooperation between the different stakeholders and the Council of Europe.

Facilitating communication and coordination

Convening meetings and workshops facilitates ongoing dialogue between relevant stakeholders. Different modes of interaction between relevant stakeholders should be an integral part of the entire NAP or NDC process to ensure that the processes are fit for purpose and effectively serve end users. Creating platforms for dialogue and communication through periodic meetings or workshops can also drive momentum and help ensure improved integration

and coordination between representatives of relevant sectors, organizations, and communities of practice. Coordination is key for effective and efficient processes that involve multiple stakeholders. For example, horizontal coordination can aid the implementation of a whole-of-government approach by helping to avoid duplication of effort or contradiction between different sectoral policies that can be counterproductive, ineffectual and may undermine the success of climate action.¹⁰³

For step-by-step practical guidance on integrating human mobility through a rural livelihood lens into national adaptation and mitigation plans, please also take a look at the **toolkit**. The toolkit is made up of nine flexible and adaptable tools, complete with guiding questions, checklists and examples.



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Glossary

Adaptation: Adjustments in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects. Adaptation can moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities, and it plays a key role in reducing exposure and vulnerability to climate change.²⁷ There are two types of adaptation:

- **Incremental adaptation:** Incremental adaptation enables the continuation of desired states or systems into the future by making small adjustments that can also prevent unsustainable and unjust practices.¹⁰⁵
- **Transformative adaptation:** Transformative adaptation tackles the root causes of vulnerability to climate change in the long term, such as poverty, inequality, or discrimination. It involves systemic changes that move away from unsustainable or undesirable practices.¹⁰⁶

Adaptive capacity: The ability of individuals, households or communities to adjust to climate risks, to respond to potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences of climate change.¹⁰⁷

Adaptation Communications: The Paris Agreement requests countries to prepare and submit Adaptation Communications, a report which outlines their adaptation priorities, efforts, and support and implementation needs around adaptation to climate change. Their submission is voluntary. These documents are meant to be country-driven and forward-looking. Countries can submit these as stand-alone documents or as part of other documents that they are preparing under the Paris Agreement, such as their National Adaptation Plan or Nationally Determined Contributions.¹⁰⁸

Adaptation strategy: A general plan of action for addressing the impacts of climate change, including climate variability and extremes.¹⁰⁷

Agriculture: Refers to all agricultural sub-sectors, including crops, livestock, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture.¹⁰⁹

Agrifood systems: Agrifood systems include all actors and interlinked activities that add value to agricultural production, as well as related off-farm activities such as food storage, aggregation, post-harvest handling, transportation, processing, distribution, marketing, disposal and consumption.⁸⁹ Rural livelihoods and agrifood systems are inextricably linked: agrifood activities are a major source of income and subsistence in low- and middle-income countries.¹¹⁰

Climate hazard: The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced climate event that may cause losses or damages, such as the loss of life, livelihoods or property, damage to infrastructure or health, or the disruption of essential services.¹¹¹

Climate-smart agriculture: An approach that helps guide actions to transform agrifood systems toward sustainable and climate-resilient practices with three objectives: (i) sustainably increasing agricultural productivity and incomes; (ii) adapting and building resilience to climate change; and (iii) reducing and removing greenhouse gas emissions, where possible.¹¹²

Coping capacity: The ability of people, institutions, organizations and systems to use available skills, values, beliefs, resources and opportunities to address, manage and overcome adverse conditions in the short to medium term.¹¹³

Coping strategy: A strategy focused on short-term reactions to unforeseen or unplanned situations resulting from sudden onset events, such as heavy rain, flash floods or storms. It involves the use of currently available knowledge, skills or resources, such as selling off household or farm assets.¹¹¹

Diaspora: Migrants or descendants of migrants, whose identity and sense of belonging have been shaped by their migration experience and background. They maintain links with their homelands and with each other based on a shared sense of history, identity or mutual experiences in the destination country.¹

Displacement: The movement of people who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, particularly as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, climate-related or human-made disasters, as well as due to other reasons that make remaining in their homes untenable.¹

Evacuation: Facilitation or organization of the transfer for individuals or groups from one area or locality to another to ensure their security, safety and well-being.¹

Exposure: The presence of people; livelihoods; species or ecosystems; environmental functions, services and resources; infrastructure; or economic, social or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected by climate change.¹¹⁴

Extreme event: An *extreme weather event* is usually rare at a particular place and time of year, while an *extreme climate event* is a pattern of extreme weather that persists for some time, such as a season. What is considered rare may change due to climate change, which increases the frequency of previously rare events. Changes in extremes can manifest either as changes in the frequency of given extremes, or as changes in their intensity.¹¹⁵

Gender responsive: Refers to policies, approaches and actions that meet two key criteria: (i) consider gender norms, roles and relations and how they affect both access to and control over resources, and (ii) take measures to actively address the harmful effects of gender norms, roles and relations, such as inequalities between men and women.^{116, 117}

Gender sensitive: Measures (including policies, approaches and actions) that consider gender perspectives, assess the differential impacts based on gender and integrate them into broader policies, plans, strategies and actions but do not address inequality caused by gendered norms, roles or relations. This approach allows for gender awareness but does not result in transformative action.¹¹⁶

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC): The INDCs are the primary means for governments to communicate internationally the steps they will take to address climate change in their own countries. Once a country ratifies the Paris Agreement, INDCs are converted to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The INDCs reflect each country's ambition for reducing emissions based on its domestic circumstances and capabilities. Some countries also include their plans for climate change adaptation.¹¹⁸

Inclusion: Authentically involving traditionally excluded individuals and groups in processes, activities, decision-making and policy. Inclusion is achieved when those included are empowered, their well-being is improved, and they gain new capacities.¹¹⁹

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): People or groups of people who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, particularly as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.¹²⁰

Immobility: Refers to the act of staying in place despite awareness of climate risks and hazards that could have detrimental impacts on people's lives and livelihoods. Immobility is usually explained by people's ability and willingness to move.¹²¹ According to this, immobility can be:

- **Voluntary:** Immobility as a reflection of the aspiration to stay due to, for example, a strong sense of place attachment and identity.
- **Involuntary:** Immobility as a result of structural constraints on people's capability to move. These constraints can be economic (lacking finances),¹²² political (migration policies),¹²³ social (lack of social networks in destination)¹²⁴ or even physical (border walls, detention centres).¹²⁵
- **Acquiescent:** Immobility which results from a combination of lack of resources and lack of willingness to move.¹²¹

Limits to adaptation: Occurs when adaptation measures are unable to avoid further climate risks and damaging impacts and can lead to loss and damage.¹²⁶ According to the IPCC,²⁷ limits to adaptation are also differentiated by:

- **Soft limits** take place when further adaptation may be possible if constraints can be overcome (i.e. measures exist but are not available).
- **Hard limits** take place when no further adaptation is possible, as no measures currently exist to overcome these limits.

Livelihood: The means by which households and individuals meet their basic needs and sustain their quality of life. Livelihood includes the assets (e.g. animals, land, food stores), capabilities (e.g. being able to deal with shocks, being able to recognize and capitalize on opportunities) and activities (e.g. planting and harvesting crops, catching fish) needed to make a living.¹²⁷ Making a living in the context of livelihoods involves both income generation and subsistence activities.

Local Adaptation Plan for Action (LAPA): Institutionalized local-level adaptation planning that aims to capture local needs and direct resources to where, when and by whom these are most needed.¹²⁸

Loss and Damage (uppercase): Refers to the policies, programmes, strategies, and actions focused on addressing loss and damage linked with impacts of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are especially vulnerable to adverse climate change impacts.²⁷

loss and damage (lowercase): Refers to the impacts of climate change not avoided by mitigation and adaptation efforts,¹²⁹ which can be economic or non-economic. Losses are things that cannot be recovered, while damages are things that can be repaired or restored.

- **Economic loss and damage** can be expressed in monetary terms, including loss of income and loss and damage to assets and property.
- **Non-economic loss and damage** cannot be expressed in monetary terms, including the loss of lives, cultural heritage and ecosystem services.¹³⁰

Marginalized populations: People and communities within a given culture, context or history that experience discrimination and exclusion (social, political or economic) because of unequal power relationships. They differ by country, though they generally include but are not limited to women, children, youth, the elderly, Indigenous Peoples, religious or ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, people with diverse sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics (SOGIESC), mobile populations, rural populations, and members of other minority groups.¹³¹

Migration: The movement of people or groups of people, either across an international border or within a state. Migration encompasses any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.¹

- **Internal migration:** When a person moves from one place to another within a country without crossing an international border.¹
- **International migration:** When a person moves to another country, crossing an international border.¹
- **Irregular migration:** Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination.¹
- **Temporary migration:** Occurs when a migrant has a specific purpose for migrating (such as work or studies) and later returns to the area of origin or migrates to another area. Two of the most common types of temporary migration are seasonal and circular migration.¹
- **Seasonal migration:** When the migrant moves for employment purposes, based on seasonality (i.e. following the agricultural seasonal calendar) and therefore migrates for only part of the year.
- **Circular migration:** When the migrant moves repeatedly between their destination and their place of origin, either temporarily or long-term.

Mitigation: A human intervention to not only reduce emissions but also remove carbon from the atmosphere, for example, by enhancing carbon sinks such as oceans, forests and soil that accumulate and store greenhouse gases.¹¹³

National Adaptation Plan (NAP): A plan developed under the process established by the Cancun Adaptation Framework.⁵³ The NAPs enable developing countries to identify medium- and long-term adaptation needs and to develop and implement strategies and programmes to address those needs. The NAPs are meant to be a continuous, progressive and iterative process that follows a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach.¹³²

National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs): Plans that least developed countries submit to the UNFCCC. They identify priority actions for responding to their most urgent and immediate needs regarding adaptation to climate change. The NAPAs are action-oriented, country-driven, flexible and based on national circumstances.¹³³

Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): They are the efforts of countries to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The Paris Agreement requires each Party of the UNFCCC to prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve, which should be updated every five years.¹³⁴

Planned relocation: A planned process in which people or groups of people move or are assisted to move away from their homes or place of temporary residence to a new location.¹ Planned relocation can take place in response to observed or anticipated risks and hazards associated with climate change, such as sea-level rise. Ideally, planned relocation should be undertaken with the participation of affected communities.

Refugees: Refugees are people who have fled war, violence, conflict or persecution and have crossed an international border to find safety in another country. Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin.¹³⁵

Remittances: Personal transfers of money (**financial remittances**), as well as goods or services (**in-kind remittances**), made by migrants to individuals or communities with whom the migrant has links. Remittances include transfers made both across borders and within countries, as well as transfers made both within and outside the formal financial system.¹⁴²

Social remittances are transfers of ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital from migrants to their communities of origin.¹³⁷

Resilience: The ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as anticipating, absorbing, accommodating or recovering from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving livelihood systems in the face of threats that impact agriculture, nutrition, food security and food safety.⁸⁹

Rural area: Definitions of “rural” usually address one or more of three dimensions that characterize rural areas:¹³⁸

- **Sparse settlement** – rural areas are more sparsely populated and settled.
- **Land cover** – rural areas have more vegetation and fewer human-made features (such as buildings).
- **Remoteness** – rural areas are more remote, represented by the difficulty of physical travel to places where markets and services are more available, which affects the opportunities people have to gain access to markets and public services.

Slow onset events and processes: Refers to climatic events and processes that evolve gradually due to cumulative changes over an extended time frame. They include rising temperatures, desertification, biodiversity loss, land and forest degradation, glacial retreat, ocean acidification, sea-level rise and salinization.¹³⁹

Sudden onset events: Climatic and non-climatic events that emerge quickly or unexpectedly. They include meteorological hazards such as tropical cyclones, hurricanes, or typhoons; hydrological hazards such as floods and mudslides; and geophysical hazards such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanic activity. They can cause extensive damage within a short period of time.

Vulnerability: The susceptibility of people being adversely affected by climate hazards, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability encompasses the sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and the lack of capacity to cope or adapt.²⁷



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